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Abstract 
 
There are strong links between agriculture and industry. But does low or high 
improvement in agricultural productivity give the fastest overall development? In a 
structuralist two-sector model, the answer is that it depends on the food budget share. An 
efficient real wage results in a target for the agricultural terms of trade. If relative 
agricultural price lies above the target inflation occurs. Optimal policies, at high food 
budget shares, are keeping food prices stable, raising agricultural productivity and 
industrial demand. A nominal agricultural price rise may lead to a worsening relative 
terms of trade and lower farm incomes. East Asian economies got the transition right, but 
in India political economy factors forced an early rise in food prices. Liberalisation offers 
an opportunity to shift to the optimum policy set. The shift will be more feasible if 
corporates invest in agriculture. This will increase agricultural productivity, and help 
revive industrial growth. 
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Agriculture and Industry: enhancing mutual gains 
 
1. Introduction 
Industrial performance in India is closely connected to agriculture. Fluctuations in 
agricultural output normally affect industrial growth in that year and with a lag. There are 
strong links between the two sectors. The question we analyze in this paper is does low or 
high improvement in agricultural productivity give the fastest overall development? In a 
structuralist two-sector model, the answer we get is that it depends on the food budget 
share. An efficient real wage results in a target for the agricultural terms of trade. If 
relative agricultural price lies above the target inflation occurs. Optimal policies, at high 
food budget shares, are stable food prices, raising agricultural productivity and industrial 
demand. A nominal agricultural price rise may lead to a worsening relative terms of trade 
and lower farm incomes. The farmer can buy more in real terms when he raises his price 
less. 
Next, we apply the model to compare South with East Asian development. East 
Asian economies got the transition right, which may be part of the explanation for their 
more rapid development. In India political economy factors forced an early rise in food 
prices which harmed development. Is argued that liberalisation and global changes offer 
an opportunity to shift to the optimum policy set. This will stabilize agricultural prices 
and stimulate industrial demand. It will also offer a major opportunity for industry to 
invest in agriculture in new initiatives such as contract farming, increase productivity in 
agriculture, and boost industrial growth.   
At high per capita incomes, food is a small part of the budget; therefore 
agriculture naturally shrinks with development. It is well accepted that agriculture 
provides essential resources for development, but there is debate over whether high or 
low agricultural productivity is more conducive to rapid development. In many countries 
changes that raised agricultural productivity and released labour and food for industry 
were a precondition for development. But in dualistic models of development it is the 
stagnation of the traditional sector that shifts resources to the higher productivity modern 
sector.  
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In classical dual economy models
1
, with surplus labour, rapid growth requires real 
wages to be constant at subsistence. As rising profits are saved and invested labor shifts 
to the sector with higher productivity. Transfer of labor and food from agriculture to 
industry provides a surplus for development. It is the higher modern sector productivity 
that is emphasized
2
. But a key feature of such dual economies is that the average 
household spends the major share of its budget on food. A rise in the relative price of 
food then raises nominal wages and inflation. Rising agricultural productivity is 
necessary to break this link. 
We demonstrate these issues in a minimalist two-sector macro-model. There is 
surplus labor so that real wages equal the average product of labor in the traditional 
sector and the marginal product can lie below this, but nutritional requirements set a 
target real wage. Demand for food is elastic at low per capita incomes in line with Engel's 
law, which says that as incomes rise a smaller proportion is spent on food so that income 
elasticity of food exceeds unity only at low per capita incomes. Analysis is normally 
restricted to the short-run, or to the steady state where food shares would be low, and 
transitional dynamics that occur when the elasticities switch, have been neglected. We 
demonstrate the sensitivity of the comparative static results to this switch. The results are 
that output is maximised and inflation is minimised on the transition path to the end of 
dualism, if agricultural productivity and industrial demand are stimulated. Once the 
budget share of food shrinks, and farm incomes begin to fall, a different policy set will be 
required.  
If agriculture and wages are a source of demand for industry, real wages do not 
have to be constant at subsistence for rapid development. As wages rise, the increase in 
units sold may compensate for a fall in profit mark-up, so that the profit rate rises. But if 
food budget shares are high, labor productivity determines the relative prices that are 
consistent with the efficient real wage, and this may lie below the relative price that 
clears the two markets. In this case, agricultural labor productivity determines the actual 
relative prices, and must rise for a non-inflationary rise in real wages to be possible. The 
target efficiency wage can itself rise, as a more diversified consumption basket becomes 
                                                 
1
 The classic papers are Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961). They spawned an enormous literature.  
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the norm. These considerations help to understand why the average real wage rate has 
been rising
3
, even in countries, which are far from having absorbed their entire labor 
surplus and achieved the transition to a developed economy. On average, employers have 
found it worthwhile to pass on higher productivity to workers. But complementary 
policies that raise agricultural productivity and keep food prices low are required for 
wages to rise without adverse effects on output and inflation.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 a minimalist structuralist 
macromodel is developed. Section 3 derives the comparative static response to shocks. 
Section 4 shows how the model can be applied to explain differential rates of 
development in South and East Asia. Section 5 concludes. Results are derived in the 
appendix.   
   
2. The Model 
The basic short-run dual economy model
4
 for a developing country has two sectors. 
Agricultural output is given in the short-run, and prices adjust to clear the market, while 
the industrial output is demand determined
5
. That is, variation of output in response to 
demand clears the market, because of imperfect competition and fixed overheads in 
industry, prices are set as a mark-up on costs. Demand for industry rises as terms of trade 
move in favour of agriculture and farm incomes rise. We adapt the short-run model in 
order to analyse the transition path that abolishes dualism the fastest.  
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 There is also a literature that underlines the importance of raising agricultural productivity for removing 
poverty, for example, Lipton, 1977. 
3
 The average daily earnings, in 1960 prices, of Indian agricultural laborers grew steadily from 0.88 in 
1972-73 to 1.93 in 1993-94 (Vaidyanathan, 2000, Table 2). Thus even labour surplus countries such as 
India and China have followed Kaldor's stylised facts that income shares tend to remain constant but the 
wage rate goes up as labour input per unit output falls, thus supporting an efficiency wage argument. 
4
 Cardoso (1981) gave a clean formalisation of structuralist arguments, which had originated in Latin 
America in the sixties. A number of variants have been developed. Our model differs in the emphasis on 
Engel effects, efficiency wages and the focus on the medium-run transition path. Since the model has been 
earlier derived from primitives of preference, technology and institutions we do not go into this, and stick 
to the simplest level of analysis required for our question. 
5
 We are considering an economy that has a sufficiently developed modern sector, so that Rao’s (1952) 
criticism does not apply. Rao pointed out that the short-run Keynesian multiplier would not hold in a 
developing economy because of specific shortages that it would soon run into. In our model industrial 
output is demand determined, but for this to be sustained over a number of periods, it is important that the 
expenditure components that are rising include investment. 
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The variables are: Agricultural output, QA, and price PA, nonagricultural output 
QI, and price, PI. The levelw, of the real product industrial wage in terms of agricultural 
goods
6
, is set to maximize labour efficiency
7
. Therefore it equals the average product in 
industry. W is nominal wages. 
w =W/PA 
Agricultural labour is also paid its average product, although this may be due to surplus 
labour. Average product of labour in agriculture may be below that in industry due to 
skill differences and other cost of mobility. Industrial prices are set as a mark-up
8
 on 
wage costs, where m is the profit share. LI is labour required to produce one unit of 
industrial output, and  the trend rise in average labour productivity in industry. 
Therefore:  
PI = [(LI (1 - ))/(1-m)]W 
Substituting out W from the two equations gives the terms of trade that satisfies the target 
real wage: 
PI / PA = [(LI (1 - )w)/(1 – m)] 
Solving for  = PA / PI, we get: 
 = [(1- m) / (LI (1 - )w)]                                                    (1) 
We assume the average budget share of food is high. The propensities to consume out of 
total income are cI for industrial output, and cA for agricultural output. The fixed 
consumption propensities imply that the consumption basket of agricultural income 
earners is similar to that of industrial income earners, but both classes spend a larger 
share of their income on agricultural goods. Therefore cA exceeds cI, and demand for 
agricultural output rises by a factor  when PA rises, and workers attempt to maintain 
                                                 
6
 If the real wage is specified in terms of the price level, the argument changes quantitatively but not 
qualitatively as long as the share of agriculture in consumption is large; which is an assumption we make 
here. Therefore we retain the simple specification. 
7
 Stiglitz (1974) was an early presentation of the efficiency wage argument. If a worker’s output depends 
upon effort as well as time, profit maximisation equates the average product to the wage rate. Literature 
validating such wages continues to develop. Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue that the labour demand 
function is horizontal in the medium-run with changing capital stock, at a level linked to technology and 
productivity. Increases in the latter are passed on in real wages.   
8
 This is a simplification but can be derived optimally from industry structure arguments. In Goyal (1999) 
the mark-up is derived by the profit maximisation of risk-averse firms in a more general dynamic model. 
When food prices rise, firms need to offer higher wages to induce the efficient effort level, but because 
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their consumption of food. Demand for industry falls by the same factor. We call  > 0 
the Engel effect
9
. A percentage of income is saved. Therefore:  
0 < cI < cA < 1 
cI + cA < 1 
Savings are taxed to finance government expenditure G. Since industrial output is 
demand determined, G is an exogenous policy decision that raises industrial output to the 
point where savings generated equal G. Now the supply equal to demand or market 
clearing equation for the agricultural sector can be written as: 
PAQA = cA (PA QA + PI QI) +   PA   
For the industrial sector:  
PIQI = cI (PA QA + PI QI) -  PA + PI G 
Rewriting with  as the dependent variable, the two equations become, respectively: 
 = [cA / ((1-cA)QA - )] QI                                                     (2) 
 = [(1-cI)/ (cIQA - )] QI - G/(cIQA - )                                           (3) 
Demand for the product of each sector is a function of income and relative prices. 
Equations 1, 2 and 3 are graphed in Figure 1. The AA (II) curve graphs equation 2 (3) or 
the combination of  and QI that yield equilibrium in the agricultural (industrial
10
) 
market. Equation 1 is graphed as the horizontal line at the level of  that satisfies the 
efficiency wage target;  will tend to fall above this line. Below the AA curve excess 
demand for agriculture (EDA) is positive and  will rise. Above the II curve excess 
demand for industry (EDI) is positive and QI will rise.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
output falls the optimal mark-up is constant or rising, so that prices must rise. If the mark-up set is optimal, 
trying to change it through policy will only induce distortions on the supply-side.    
9
 Eswaran and Kotwal (JDE, 1993) is an example of a two-sector general equilibrium model where 
preferences between food and textiles reflect Engel elasticities. 
10
 We rule out the case where the industry equilibrium curve is downward sloping. Rakshit (1989) explores 
this variant on the grounds that as  rises real wages fall and landlords who gain at the expense of profit 
earners and fixed income groups, spend relatively less on industrial goods. Therefore a rise in industrial 
output was only possible if agricultural terms of trade fell. This case is relevant in very early stages of 
development. But as real wages rise, the landlord’s share shrinks. Industrial goods are widely consumed in 
rural areas, by landlords as well as workers, even in labour surplus countries, so that as terms of trade move 
in favour of agriculture, demand rises for industry. Many market studies support the importance of demand 
from agriculture for industrial goods. The rural household today demands a varied portfolio of branded 
industrial goods, ranging from soaps to tractors.  
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Figure 1: The three equilibrium conditions 
 
Stability requires that the II curve (equation 2) is steeper than the AA curve (equation 3).  
AII
dQ
d
dQ
d
I

  
This condition is satisfied as long as savings are positive, since consumption propensities 
multiplied by savings propensities must be greater than the consumption propensities 
alone (see appendix A.1). As income rises with QI, a greater rise is required in  for 
equilibrium in the industrial goods market compared to the agricultural market. The 
stability condition ensures that a rise in QI will not cause an aggravation of the excess 
demand for QI. Otherwise as positive excess demand for agriculture (EDA) drives up , 
excess demand for industry (EDI) will stay positive and drive up QI. 
If the variables lie in an area such as DBC (figure 1), excess demand for 
agriculture will raise PA. But then the real wage target will not be satisfied, so firms will 
raise W, and from equation 1, PI. Therefore  will not rise enough to remove EDA, and 
the process will continue as PA rises again. Agricultural productivity is too low to give a 
 low enough to attain the target efficiency wage. The attempt to raise W in order to reach 
it induces inflation, hence the target wage is not obtained 
On the medium-run transition path, QA changes. The area DBC can shrink or 
expand in the next period. Early structuralist theories regarded raising productivity in 
agriculture as very difficult because of entrenched tenure systems but in the Asian 
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experience a considerable rise in agricultural productivity was achieved as a result of the 
green revolution. There are other feasible reforms such as changes in the structure of 
marketing. Some of these are discussed in Section 4
11
. Shocks to agricultural productivity 
also shift the position of the AA curve.  
Since a rise in agricultural prices raises total income, in the model, it raises 
demand for industry. Income distribution changes with the real wage target. As 
agricultural incomes and real wages rise with productivity, demand for industrial output 
rises. This simple analytical framework delivers some interesting results. 
 
3. Variations in Agricultural Output 
The endogenous variables are  and QI, they respond to shocks in the exogenous 
variables G and QA. An agricultural shock leads to a proportional shift in both curves 
with that in the AA curve being greater since 1- cA = cI + s > cI. The interesting result is 
that  falls but QI is unchanged after a favorable agricultural shock if Engel effects are 
absent; with them QI  rises and the fall in  is moderated.  
Comparative static results derived in the appendix are summarized below: 
1. A rise (fall) in G raises (lowers)  and QI. 
2. A rise (fall) in agricultural output lowers (raises)  and increases (decreases) QI 
unless  is zero in which case QI is unchanged. 
3. A rise (fall) in agricultural output combined with a calibrated rise (fall) in G can 
leave  unchanged and raise (lower) QI compared to the original position.  
4. Since a rise (fall) in G acts to raise (lower) , if the change in G is large enough, it 
can reverse the effects of the changes in agricultural output on  in 2 above. The 
effects of G and agricultural output on  are in the opposite directions.  
 
Insights from these comparative static results are summarised in Propositions 1 and 
2.  
 
                                                 
11
 Explicitly introducing imports and exports in the market clearing equations 2 and 3 will shift out both II 
and AA curves under the assumption that food is imported, industrial goods exported and trade is balanced, 
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Proposition 1: A rise in  will be associated with lower QI after an adverse agricultural 
shock, and higher QI after a rise in G. 
Proof: Point 1 and 2 above.  
  
In the Lewis model a rise in the relative price of agriculture lowers profits and growth. In 
this model, although a rise in  raises industrial demand, if there are no Engel effects the 
fall in QA neutralizes the rise in  fully. If  is zero, since the proportionate rise in  
equals the proportionate fall in QA, agricultural incomes and industrial demand stay 
constant. But  is positive because the relatively greater cost of food, after a rise in , 
lowers demand for QI. With positive  the fall in  is less than proportionate to a rise in 
QA, so that agricultural incomes will rise (fall) with a trend rise (fall) in QA.  
Claim 1: But if  rises above  inflation occurs, this forces a fiscal contraction, which 
lowers QI . 
As  rises above, wages fall below target. In a populous democracy governments are 
very sensitive to inflation, since it is a major electoral issue. If inflation is above a 
minimum threshold G is cut. This lowers QI  (see point 1). 
 
Therefore although a rise in  may not directly lower industrial output, it does lower it 
indirectly. Fundamentally  rises when QA is too low, so that the inflationary triangle 
DBC is positive. A fall in G is one way of closing the triangle, but this harms industrial 
output.  
  
Proposition 2: If the inflationary triangle exists, a rise in either  or QA, or both, can 
shrink the triangle, without a fall in QI.  
Proof: If  rises PI falls from the mark-up equation (PI = [(LI (1 - ))/(1-m)]W) which is 
derived from the wage-price process.   Therefore  and  rise. When  crosses through 
point D in Figure 1, the inflationary gap is closed. Alternatively, if QA rises so that the 
AA curve passes through point C the triangle is also closed. Both D and C lie on the II 
curve and therefore are points of maximal QI.  
                                                                                                                                                 
as in Cardoso (1981). The model here is restricted to a closed economy.  
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But as long as the share of food in the consumption basket is high, a rise in the real 
efficient and actual wage will require a rise in agricultural productivity. 
 
Proposition 3: A rise in agricultural productivity is one of the conditions that can realise 
the real efficient wage target in industry. But it is necessary to raise the target wage if 
agriculture accounts for the major share of consumption.  
Proof: The first part follows from Proposition 2. Inflation lowers real wages, so if the 
inflation gap is closed the real efficient wage target can be attained. A rise in QA closes 
the inflation gap. For the second part, underlying our definition of target wagesw = 
W/PA is the implicit assumption that agriculture accounts for a major share of 
consumption so that nominal wages need to rise with agricultural prices. From this 
equation, if PA falls as agricultural productivity rises, w rises unambiguously. If PA is 
constant, differentiating the mark-up equation PI = [(LI (1 - ))/(1-m)]W, we get W/ = 
[-(PI (1 - )(1-m))/LI)]}< 0 unless  >1. Such a high level of  is not feasible. 
 
The results imply that a rise in agricultural productivity is required for raising real 
industrial wages
12
 without inflation. The agricultural wage can rise only if the average 
product rises in agriculture. If the wage target were specified in terms of the aggregate 
price level, the new would lie strictly above the determined by the real product 
wage. But as long as the share of agriculture in the consumption basket is high and its 
average productivity lies below that required by the target wage the over-determined area 
BCD would exist. If most of wages are spent on food real wages cannot rise without 
inflation, unless food becomes cheaper.  
A rise in agricultural productivity makes possible a rise in real product wages 
such that the target real wage can be reached. It could shift the AA curve such that the 
new equilibrium is at or below the value of   that delivers the target wage (figure 2 and 
                                                 
12
 Lewis (1954) had the same conclusion when trade was introduced in his model. Terms of trade were 
determined by relative labour productivities. He showed that surplus L countries should never export their 
subsistence product.  Such a country got more of the gains from trade if its productivity in the subsistence 
sector rose. But his argument was based on the effect of relative productivities on wages and the terms of 
trade, ours on sectoral demand and inflation.  
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A2). Combined with a rise
13
 in G the required value of  can be exactly reached, with a 
rise in QI. Since the II curve also swivels out with the rise in QA, but the shift is less than 
that in the AA curve, at the new equilibrium point  may lie below. Then a parallel 
shift to the II curve, from the rise in G, is feasible without inflation. By itself a rise in G 
tends to raise both  and QI. Combined with a rise in QA it ensures that  stays at. 
These arguments lead to: 
 
Proposition 4: The best policy combination to lower inflation and enhance output, for an 
economy in a positive inflationary triangle, is to raise agricultural availability in the 
short-term and productivity in the long-term together with stimuli for industrial demand.   
Proof: From the comparative static results it is clear that a positive agricultural shock, 
with Engel effects present, raises QI and lowers . When the food budget share is high, 
the fall in  is less than proportionate to the rise in QA, so that agricultural incomes rise. 
A rise in G raises both QI and . Therefore a combination of a rise in QA and G can be 
designed such that QI is raised and  kept at. This delivers the largest increase in QI 
and agricultural incomes consistent with zero inflation.   
Figure 2 illustrates this combination, for the case with no Engel effects. A positive 
agricultural shock shifts AA out to AA'. In the new equilibrium  falls below, while QI 
is unchanged. A simultaneous rise in G raises QI, while bringing  up to. The triangle 
BCD in Figure 1, that leads to inflation is closed. With positive Engel effects QI rises 
even without the rise in G, and the fall in  is less than proportionate to the rise in QA, but 
still some rise in G is feasible. When the food budget share is high and the income 
elasticity of demand for food exceeds unity, agricultural incomes rise with QA. A rise in 
G, bringing  up to, will raise them to the maximum extent possible with zero inflation 
and the largest non-inflationary rise in QI. 
                                                 
13
 The sustainable short-term monetary fiscal policy is a function of the institutions of a country. Bruno and 
Sachs (1985) argued that since in America 3 year staggered nominal wage contracts were the norm, 
monetary policy could be stimulatory. In Germany wages were fixed in real terms so that a tight monetary 
policy was required. In Latin America high per capita incomes, full indexation and political awareness 
leads to conflict over income shares resulting in a wage-price spiral. In surplus labour developing countries 
if wages are fixed in terms of food prices, macro policy can be stimulatory as long as food inflation is 
moderate and agricultural productivity rises.  
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Figure 2: The ideal policy combination  
 
Although QA is given in period one, the supply response in period two depends on 
period one profits, not only terms of trade
14
. Agricultural profits and incomes will rise 
more with a stable, rather than a rising,  when food budget shares are high. In the next 
section we apply the model and find that differing food price policy may form part of the 
explanation for differential development.  
 
4. The Political Economy of Incentives for Farmers 
Our model suggests that agricultural productivity must be rising for food prices to be 
stable so that development is most rapid, at high food budget shares. As the latter shrink 
even if productivity growth concentrates in the modern sector, food prices rise, and 
agriculture shrinks, this will not harm the development process. When budget shares are 
high so is the demand elasticity of food, and therefore rising demand for food at stable 
prices gives the largest rise in farm incomes. Moreover, a rise in absolute prices does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
14
 Empirical studies of farmers’ supply response have always used terms of trade because of lack of data on 
costs. But that is not a restriction on theoretical studies. Sah and Stiglitz (1984) argue for turning the terms 
of trade in favour of farmers, but their argument depends crucially on a high price response of the rural 
surplus. We have tried to show that the real profit response should be considered, and raising the 
agricultural price level will not necessarily turn the terms of trade in farmers’ favour. 
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guarantee a rise in relative prices or terms of trade for farmers. Therefore stable prices are 
the best incentives for farmers in these conditions. When food budget shares fall, 
however, even rising food prices and subsidies are not sufficient to maintain farm 
incomes and prevent agriculture from shrinking. 
Although Asian countries were typical labour surplus countries all of them 
realized the importance of increasing agricultural productivity. The sixties and seventies 
were the years of the green revolution, concerns about food security and being self-
sufficient in food. East Asian countries were the successful developers in this period. 
Comparing their experience with that of developing Asia illustrates the stylized 
conclusions of our model
15
, because these countries were careful to moderate food price 
increases and focus on a rise in agricultural productivity as long as food budget shares 
were high. Only after that were food prices rise and nominal rate of protection in 
agriculture allowed to rise.  
In Japan food budget shares fell below fifty per cent in the post war period, and in 
Taiwan and Korea in the sixties. In Korea, expenditure on food as a percentage of total 
expenditure of urban households
16
 was 45 per cent in 1960. At around this period, income 
per farm household as a proportion of income per non-farm household began to fall. In 
Taiwan it fell from 94.8 in 1966 to 79.1 in 1971 and in Korea it shrank from 99.7 in 1965 
to 67.1 in 1970. China reached this stage by the late eighties
17
.  
Along with budget shares even absolute per capita consumption of rice fell. In 
Taiwan this was 134.5 kg per year in 1970 but 100.8 in 1980, as diets diversified to 
include more milk, vegetables and fruit. Nominal rates of agricultural protection, which 
were negative earlier turned positive in the seventies. East Asia illustrates the shift from 
                                                 
15
 Over 1989-91 the average cereal yield (kg per ha) in East and Southeast Asia was 3.817 (even higher 
than North America/Oceania’s 3.734) compared to 1.919 in South Asia (see Dyson, 1999). This brings out 
the difference in agricultural productivity.  
16
 Statistics for Korea and Taiwan are from Francks et.al (1999). 
17
 Expenditures on grain alone were 22.8 per cent of total household expenditures in 1957 but 7.6 per cent 
by 1987, for an average urban Chinese household. In 1978 average per capita net income in yuan was 133 
and share of nonagricultural income was only 7 for an agricultural household. In 1987 the figures were 463 
and 25.4 respectively (Lin, 1994).  The terms of trade between industry and agriculture had been steadily 
moving in favor of agriculture from 92.1 in 1951 (1950=100), to 29.6 in 1989, but for the first time they 
turned adverse and rose to 33.3 in 1993. Over 1986-1995, the average rate of protection for agricultural 
exports rose from –38.88 to –20.29, and for imports from 26.54 to 38.96 (Yamamoto, H., 2000). These are 
the trends that we expect at the time of the switch. 
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taxing to subsidizing agriculture as per capita incomes rise. These countries had taxed
18
 
agriculture to fund development. Although they kept food prices low, this did not prevent 
agricultural incomes rising, during the period when food budget shares were high. The 
governments continued to invest in agricultural infrastructure and other measures to raise 
agricultural productivity. Farm incomes began falling when development had proceeded 
sufficiently to lower budget shares below fifty per cent. And then governments turned 
from taxing to subsidizing agriculture as political pressures mounted to protect farmer's 
incomes. Since the share of population in agriculture was now small, this was not such a 
burden. In this period food prices began to rise, and since food was now a small part of 
the budget, prices could rise without pressure on wages and inflation. Farm populations 
were also smaller so that the subsidies were a bearable burden.  
 
Table 1: The Impact of Government Intervention in the Rice Market 
Rice Prices (NT$ per kg) Government collection 
as % of rice marketed  Government purchase price Retail Wholesale 
1951 0.70 1.29 1.10 55 (1950) 
1956 2.56 3.20 2.66 63 
1961 2.80 5.86 5.12 53 (1960) 
1966 3.17 5.95 5.26 50 
1971 4.18 7.19 5.90 38 (1970) 
Source: Francks et.al. (1999) 
 
Taiwan was one of the most successful developers therefore we examine its 
experience, before the turning point, in more detail. Estimates of agriculture's balance of 
trade or the difference between its sales to and purchases from the other sectors of the 
economy amount to 10 per cent of agricultural income in 1956-60. The financing of this 
transfer is through visible items such as income and savings flows and taxation. But 
invisible flows through terms of trade effects made up more than 50 per cent of the total. 
"Fu and Shei…suggest that transfers due to term-of-trade distortions amounted to 6.3 per 
cent of total agricultural production in 1952-5, 5.8 per cent in 1956-60 and 0.6 per cent in 
1961-5, with the terms of trade thereafter beginning to turn in agriculture's favour." 
(Francks et.al.1999). Rice as the main food crop was the focus of government 
                                                 
18
 In Taiwan over 1956-60 government direct taxes were 15 per cent of agricultural income (Francks, 
op.cit. pp 170) 
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intervention. Table 1 documents the effects on rice price in the period. It is clear that rice 
prices were kept low, and government procurement was a tax at below market price. At 
the same time, however, the government continued to invest in improving agriculture's 
infrastructure. The growth of total agricultural output, over the period 1947-74 was 5.1 
per cent per annum.  
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand (Mitra, 1994) followed similar policies of low 
food prices, and investment in agricultural infrastructure. And since, with low food prices 
farm incomes grew most rapidly in this period, it is not correct to call them a tax. Table 2 
collects some key facts to link transitions in food price policy to food budget shares in 
Asia.   
 
Table 2: Profile of Agriculture in Asia 
Countries Farm 
incomes 
Food budget share 
 < 50 
Cereal budget 
shares 
Agricultural 
terms of trade 
Transfers from 
agriculture 
Taiwan 94.8(1966), 
79.1(1971) 
1960s  1965 (1956-60) 10% 
Korea 99.7(1965), 
67.1(1970) 
1960 (45)    
China    80s  22.8(1957), 
7.6(1987) 
  1950s but 
retail prices, 
    90s  
 
Japan  Post-War    
India  80 (65% of population in 73-74). 
BS > 50 (95% rural population, 
80% urban population in 90s) 
38.3 rural 
25.7 urban 
(1993-94) 
  
Source : Francks et.al (1999), Lin (1994), Eswaran and Kotwal (1993), Shariff and Mallick (1999) 
 
These countries had certain other specific advantages such as equality of land 
holdings, norms of cooperation having to do with stable rice producing village economies 
(Hayami, 1998), a high level of education and infrastructure, and export led growth that 
created urban jobs for rural labor. Countries in South Asia did not share all these. But 
they also went through a green revolution in the sixties, with large increases in 
agricultural productivity giving them self-sufficiency in food. Lewisian ideas of a 
shrinking agriculture were replaced by one where agricultural productivity had to rise to 
stimulate development. Yet, in the nineties, food still accounted for more than fifty 
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percent of household expenditure among 95 per cent of rural households and 80 per cent 
of urban households in India
19
. What went wrong? 
One reason was the belief, and its forceful articulation by a dominant farm lobby, 
that rising agricultural prices, and subsidized farm inputs were essential as incentives for 
farmers to adopt green revolution technology. The result was persistent low-grade 
inflation as support prices helped periodically shock the terms of trade above. The 
economy remained trapped in the inflationary triangle. The rising agricultural price level 
did not guarantee a favorable agricultural terms of trade, as nominal wages and industrial 
prices also rose. Output expansion was below potential. In India the move to subsidizing 
agriculture came when food budget shares were still high. 
The Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) recommends prices to 
be set; but the Government finally decides. According to the CACP (GOI, 1998), higher 
prices were set in the seventies, when the green revolution commenced, as incentives to 
farmers to adopt new techniques. In the eighties the rate of increase was kept low to share 
the gains of better productivity with consumers. In the nineties as productivity growth 
slowed more rapid price increases were given. But an indication that prices were set too 
high is the steady increase in stocks with the Government. The average level rose from 
10.1 million tonnes in the seventies to 13.8 in the eighties and 17.4 in the nineties. In July 
2002 it peaked at 63 million tonnes (source: Government of India). The distinction 
between the procurement and support price was lost from the seventies, and the support 
price, at which farmers could make assured sales, approached the market price. In the 
nineties it had overtaken the latter. Politicians, influenced by the farm lobby, often 
granted rates of increase above the recommendations of the CACP. Still both agricultural 
price and income terms of trade showed more sustained improvement in the eighties 
compared to the nineties. Table 3 gives a variety of comparative price and quantity 
indices. The average per annum agricultural growth was 2.8 in the nineties compared to 4 
per cent in the eighties. Although the increase in absolute agricultural price level was 
lower in the eighties output growth was more rapid. This suggests that India is still in the 
range where elasticity of demand for agriculture is high, so that agricultural incomes rise 
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 Figures from the Indian National Sample Survey, reported in the IGIDR Annual Report, 1998-99, by 
Swaminathan, M. 
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more with output increase, even after correcting for the effect of buffer stock and public 
food distribution policy. More moderate nominal price increase gives better agricultural 
output and income growth.    
Table 3: Price Policy and its Consequence 
      (percent per annum) 
Rate of growth in    1980s 1990s 
WPI primary articles  7.1 9 
WPI foodgrains 7.2 11.2 
Index nos. of agricultural production 4.2 1.7 
Agricultural GDP at (1993-94 prices) 3.8 3.1 
Wheat procurement price 8.4 14.3 
Index nos. of wheat production  4.7 3.7 
Agricultural price terms of trade (range) +8 +7 
Source: Calculated from Economic Survey 2000-01 
 
Agriculture was totally exempt from taxes. But the agricultural lobby got it 
accepted that agriculture was discriminated against since the import substitution regime 
in place protected a high-cost industry, and restricted agricultural exports. While support 
prices were consistently raised, without successfully improving farm incomes, protecting 
the poor was attempted through an inefficient public distribution scheme. This, and the 
pervasive input subsidies, was a drain on government finances so that there was a steady 
falling away of investment in agricultural infrastructure. In terms of our framework, the 
shift out in AA was not sufficient to close the triangle. As a result agriculture neither 
provided resources for development nor could be effectively subsidized. Thus poverty 
and low per capita incomes persist, with more than seventy per cent of the population still 
in rural areas. Moreover, when there was an adverse agricultural supply shock, G was cut, 
thus lowering inflation, but harming industrial output. The effects of fiscal contractions 
tend to continue beyond one period.   
 China in moving to the household responsibility system in 1978 had raised quota 
(purchase) prices by 17 per cent, but retail prices of grain and edible oil were not 
changed, and the government bore an increasing subsidy (Lin, 1994). Retail prices were 
allowed to rise only in the nineties when food budget shares had fallen
20
. These policies 
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 In 1993-94 when grain budget shares were below 7 for China, cereal shares were 24.2 for rural and 14 for 
urban Indian households (NSSO, 1996). They were at the latter levels for rural China in the fifties. The 
total food shares for India were respectively 63.2 and 54.7.  
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worked better in China than in India since agricultural productivity was almost double 
that in India to start off with, so that the triangle was smaller. Moreover, since China 
started from a totally repressed non-market system, the price rise was in the nature of an 
initial realignment. The more important incentives for farmers came from the freedoms 
given. The rapid expansion in industrial employment for exports helped to raise the 
average product in agriculture by reducing labor dependent on agriculture.   
 What can South Asian countries, which have the highest concentration of the 
world’s poor, do now? Initial conditions such as tenurial structures, education and 
infrastructure are vital but can change only slowly, especially when government has very 
little money. But the post-Uruguay round world gives some new opportunities to stabilize 
food prices at world levels, with general productivity correction coming from level of the 
nominal exchange rate.  
Protest from the domestic farm lobby should be muted if international prices are 
used as a benchmark for grain procurement prices, since they had argued for closer links 
to world prices earlier when domestic prices were much below international. Their 
comparative advantage in many crops at current exchange rates, still gives them an 
interest in liberalisation
21
. They can diversify their crop portfolio and earn a higher 
average amount by cultivating high value added export and cash crops, while an 
international parity support price for grains gives them an assured income component, 
since demand for basic foods is still elastic
22
. This will ensure that enough grains are 
cultivated to provide essential domestic food security, while allowing a flexible response 
to changing demand patterns. Domestic demand for cash crops is also rising and 
corporate support will be essential in improving the marketing infrastructure for export 
and more generally.  Many Indian States are actively encouraging corporate contract 
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 In India agricultural liberalization started in 1994 and will be completed by 2004. WTO permissible 
aggregate measure of support is 10 per cent; in the Indian case this is currently negative, estimates put it at 
about –40 per cent. Permissible tariff bindings are at 100 per cent compared to the 30 per cent that are 
actually in force. Agricultural exports in US Dollars nearly doubled over 1992-1997 compared to 1986-
1990, although they slowed in the subsequent period. Imports grew only moderately at about 20 per cent. 
Sharp rise occurred in exports of meat, dairy, rice, vegetables and fruits, sugar, animal feeds and vegetable 
oils (see, Panda and Ganesh-Kumar, 2000). 
22
 Vaidyanathan (2000) estimates that a 6 per cent annual growth in GDP, and a 2 per cent population 
growth would give a 4.3 per cent annual rise in domestic demand for agricultural products. In the nineties 
agricultural output grew at only 2.8 per cent. He uses the elasticity of gross agricultural output to per capita 
GDP growth of 0.58, implicit in the Indian 8
th
 plan projections. 
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farming, even amending earlier marketing rules that required all farm produce to be kept 
in mandis. Banks are willing to lend. Enabling legislation to protect small farmers in 
contract disputes is also required. Corporates stand to gain since it will lower their raw 
material cost and improve its quality (Sabarinath, 2003). Thus industry can directly 
contribute to achieve the required rise in agricultural productivity. 
In South Asia
23
, crop processing and expansion in other rural non-agricultural 
employment can provide the multiple activities that were very important in defending 
rural household incomes in East Asia. If subsidies are lowered in world agricultural 
markets, although this is a contentious issue, and agricultural exports expand, demand 
will continue to be elastic even as domestic food budget shares fall.  
If relative prices lie in the triangle and are influenced by both the wage target and 
the market clearing equilibrium, macro policies based on these relations, will be 
successful in lowering inflation, stimulating development and reducing poverty.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Models of development have emphasized the inevitable shrinking of agriculture. But 
when food budget shares are high, unless average product in agriculture is high, or is 
rising faster than the average efficient industrial wage, inflation will occur and lead to 
slowdowns in demand and output. In transition, the optimal policy requires a coordinated 
rise in agricultural productivity and stimulus to industrial demand that keeps the economy 
at the non-inflationary terms of trade. In our model, although industrial demand rises with 
nominal agricultural incomes, a favourable shock to agricultural output gives better 
results if boosted with an additional demand stimulus. Real product wages can rise only if 
agricultural productivity rises, although inflation will be moderated if industrial 
productivity rises. A fall in industrial output after an agricultural shock may be prevented 
by a suitable policy response. The affect on inflation depends on the new position of 
agricultural terms of trade relative to that determined by the wage target. Although the 
trend of real wages, including agricultural wages, has been upward in India, the trend rise 
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 About a dozen Asian countries are still classified as low-income countries and will benefit from the 
policy set described in this paper. 
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in agricultural productivity was below that in target real wages, so that inflation and 
slower industrial growth accompanied the process.  
The model offers a new insight on why development was much faster in East 
compared to South Asia. With the green revolution and the emphasis on food self-
sufficiency in the sixties both experienced growth in agricultural productivity. But East 
Asia successfully kept food prices stable, while South Asia tried to raise terms of trade to 
boost incentives for farmers to adopt the new technology. Input and consumption 
subsidies were also given. The resulting budgetary squeeze lowered expenditure on 
essential infrastructure. The package could not deliver the required rise in agricultural 
productivity. But agricultural trade liberalization following the GATT Uruguay round 
offers an opportunity to stabilize domestic grain prices around international prices, in 
ways that would be acceptable to the powerful domestic farm lobbies. States have 
realised the necessity of directly involving corporates in order to improve agricultural 
productivity. Contract farming now offers new opportunities for industry. Industry can 
step in where policy has failed, help agriculture and itself. Such involvement will 
improve marketing infrastructure required for cash crops as farmers turn to the latter for 
exports and for rising domestic demand.  
The model can be extended in various ways, for example, explicitly modeling 
sectoral interaction in an open economy. Empirically, the differential impact of a rise in 
nominal food prices when food budget shares are high and low can be tested using cross-
country data.  
Appendix 
A.1 Comparative Static Results 
The excess demand for agriculture is: 
  0]1[  AAIA QcQc                                              A1 
And excess demand for industry: 
  0)(1  GQcQc AIII                                            A2 
The two endogenous variables are QI and  = PA/ PI. We consider three shocks: to 
agricultural output 
AQ , government consumptionG , and a combination of the two. 
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Taking total differentials, the two excess demand equations can be written as the 
simultaneous equation system: 
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D is the jacobian of the partial derivatives of the simultaneous equation system. The sign 
restrictions discussed in the text ensure that both excess demands slope upward in  and 
QI space, and the slope of the II  curve is greater than the AA curve. This ensures that 
0D . Therefore we have:  
   AAIAIAAI cQcccQcc  )1(1)1(  
This condition must also hold because the LHS expands into consumption plus savings 
propensities, which must exceed the consumption propensities on the RHS. Expanding 
the QA coefficient on the LHS, we get: 
scccccc AIIAAI  1  
and simplifying:  sQA > s  
a condition which must hold. 
 
A.1.1 The effect of a shock to G  
Using Cramer’s rule: 
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The results are illustrated in Figure A.1 
 
 
The Figure A1: A shock to G  
 
 
After a positive shock to government spending, both  and QI rise. 
 
A.1.2.    The effect of a shock to QA 
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Without the  terms the change in QA is proportionate to that in , but in the opposite 
direction, so that agricultural incomes and industrial demand are unaffected and 
0
A
I
dQ
dQ
. With Engel effects, as 0)1(   AI cc , industrial output increases with 
agricultural output. 
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This is negative from the stability condition. 
Since the absolute value of the coefficients of QA in the excess demand for agriculture 
(Equation A1) exceed those in the excess demand for industry (Equation A2) or 1- cA >cI, 
the shift in the AA curve after a shock to QA 
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Figure A2: A shock to 
AQ  
 
exceeds the shift in the II curve. The condition is actually a tautology, since 1- cA = cI +s. 
It arises from the definition of the consumption and savings propensities. It must be that 
the propensity to consume industrial output out of total income is less than itself plus the 
savings propensity. But this relationship between the consumption and savings 
propensities, that affects both the stability condition, the slopes and the relative shifts of 
the two curves, has the interesting consequence that QI moves in the same direction after 
a shock to QA and  moves in the opposite direction. Therefore  falls while QI rises after 
a positive shock to 
AQ . If =0, QI is unchanged. 
 
A.1.3.    The effect of a combined shock, with G and QA moving in the same direction. 
From A.1.2 we know that a positive (negative) agricultural shock lowers (raises)  and 
raises (lowers) QI. But from A.1.1 a positive (negative) shock to G raises (lowers) both  
and QI. Therefore if G moves in the same direction as QA the movement in QI would be 
increased and that in  moderated. The combined effect would depend on the relative size 
of the two shocks. The text (Figure 3) depicts the ideal combination where both QA and G 
rise and the net effect is a rise in QI and fall in . The worst case is where the government 
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cuts G after a fall in QA, so that QI fall steeply and  rises, although the rise is less that it 
would have been without the cut in G. 
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